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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents the theoretical basis and first results of an agent-based model (ABM) computer 
simulation that is being developed to explore cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies. Specifically, we 
focus here on Yamana, a hunter-fisher-gatherer society that inhabited the islands of southernmost portion 
of Tierra del Fuego (Argentina-Chile). Ethnographical and archaeological evidences provide arguments 
that point to the existence of sporadic aggregation events, triggered by a public call through smoke signals 
of an extraordinary confluence of resources under unforeseeable circumstances in time and space (a 
beached whale or an exceptional accumulation of fish after a low tide). During such aggregations, the 
different social units involved used to develop and improve production, distribution and consumption 
processes in a collective way. 
We try to analyse the social dynamics that explain cooperative behaviour and resource sharing during 
aggregations based on an agent based model of indirect reciprocity. Agents decide based on the success of 
public strategies of other agents. Fitness depends on the resource captured and the social capital exchanged 
in aggregation events, modulated by agent’s reputation. Our computational results identify the relative 
importance of the resource with respect to social benefits, and the easiness to detect, and hence punish, a 
defector as key factors to promote and sustain cooperative behaviour among population. 
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1. -INTRODUCTION 
Western thought has developed a long intellectual tradition exploring the reasons of cooperation, including 
theorists of XIXth Century such as Durkheim and Marx. Questions like why do people cooperate, and how 
cooperative behaviours are maintained, have been long-lasting issues in social sciences that brought an 
array of perspectives, which claim for the altruistic nature of human beings up to the idea that humans are 
naturally motivated by self-interest.  
These questions provided the baselines to design an ethnoarchaeological research project addressed to 
unveil the dynamics embedded in aggregation and cooperation processes between hunter-fisher-gatherer 
societies that inhabited the coasts of the Beagle Channel in the uttermost extreme of South America (Briz 
et al. 2009). According to the ethnographical documents these groups, who called themselves Yamana or 
Yaghan, developed sporadic aggregation events when a whale or fish stranded on the beach (Gusinde 1937). 
In such occasions, individuals who discovered this exceptional accumulation of foodstuff made a public 
call with smoke signals in order to take advantage of windfall resources, gathering together several families 
otherwise dispersed. Cooperative activities related to production, distribution and consumption processes 
were improved and social norms were reinforced. 
The general aim of our project is to identify the mechanisms involved in aggregation practices in order to 
strength social ties and to assess the role played by cooperation in historical change. The possibility to apply 
simulation in this case study enhanced the opportunity to explore the evolution of cooperative behaviours 
to the extent that the social dilemma, related to call or remain silent, can be formalized in a computer model 
used to distil the role played by different factors (e.g. scarcity and variability of resources, visibility of 
social units, reputation, etc.) in promoting or hindering aggregation events in the Yamana society.  
2. -SOCIAL COOPERATION IN HUNTER- FISHER-GATHERER SOCIETIES 
Studies about cooperation are an essential topic within social sciences. Cooperation is not only one of the 
most relevant forms of social interaction, but constitutes a key factor in understanding human development 
as a species as well as in explaining its social and historical becoming (Alexander 2008; Bowles & Gintis 
2003; Boyd & Richerson 2005; Carballo et al. 2012; Henrich & Henrich 2006; Ingold 1988; Marx & Engels 
1977; West et al. 2011). 
 
Therefore, many debates about human nature as a cooperative species versus self-interest approaches have 
raised in different disciplines (Huxley 1888; Kropotkin 1902; Wright 2011). Within formal disciplines (and 
specially in life sciences) these debates are not limited to the study of human societies as they recognize 
cooperation as an ethological specific trait of some species such as primates (de Waal & Suchak 2010; 
Warneken et al. 2007) or eusocial species (Thorne 1997; Wilson & Hölldobler 2005) . 
 
Regarding human societies, cooperation can be achieved in ways that work differently from a simple 
synchronized action that implies a mutual benefit as appears in some eusocial cases (Tarpy et al. 2004). 
Human cooperative attitudes, which are set out for developing at big-scale, have been recorded in 
anthropological studies under the umbrella of reciprocity and directly linked to other concepts such as 
redistribution and exchange (Durkheim 1909; Durkheim 1917; Malinowski 1961; Mauss 1931). Therefore, 
the fact that human cooperative dynamics far exceed relationships based on kinship or reciprocity 
(reciprocal altruism), constitutes an explanatory limitation for mainstream or traditional approaches such 
as classical evolutionary theory (Henrich & Boyd 2001). In recent times within the framework of Cultural 
Evolutionary Theory different hypothesis have been proposed in relation to the evolution of human 
cooperation (see for example Boyd and Richerson (2005) or Tomasello et al. (2012)). 
 
Human cooperation implies not only the development of a historical memory (based on learning as well as 
on social transfer of knowledge), but on a long-term foresight of social consequences of individual 
behaviour, too. There is a continuous investment in time and effort addressed to develop and maintain 
cooperation through social norms and their institutionalization (Axelrod 1986; Gumerman et al. 2003), the 
generation of social prestige mechanisms (Henrich & Boyd 2001; Henrich & Gil-White 2001; Ohtsuki & 
Iwasa 2004), the establishment of coercive and punishing mechanisms (Boyd et al. 2010; Sigmund 2007; 
Sugden 2012), the inclusion and exclusion of the group (Field 1998; Henrich 2004), or the cost of signaling 
in cooperation and group-beneficial behaviour (Bliege Bird & Smith 2005; Smith & Bliege Bird 2005). 
 
There is a general consensus on the fact that there is a surplus in reciprocity that overpasses implied material 
interests, which is addressed to be “(…) the kernel of social cohesion in general" (Narotzky 2007: 406). 
Even though cooperation is based on individual attitudes and decisions, its raison d’etre lies on its existence 
inside a network of social relations, being a structural element for human societies (Melis & Seemann 2010; 
Nowak 2006). 
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Many studies about cooperation vs. competition carried out on social sciences are based on Game Theory 
(Axelrod 1997; Elliott & Kiel 2002; Nowak & Sigmund 2000; Skyrms 2004). Within them, a cooperator is 
defined as someone who pays a cost for another individual to receive a benefit (Nowak 2006). The extreme 
stylization that this definition implies faces conceptualization of cooperation that appears in anthropological 
disciplines, where social variability and critical reading of the ethnographical documentation makes 
difficult to reach single and simplistic definitions. 
 
The study of hunter-gatherer societies has been of paramount importance to reach a knowledge about 
“human cooperation” as it happened in social simulation (Mithen 1994). Apart from the fact that during 
most of our history we have been hunter-gatherers and that currently this kind of societies still exist 
(Henrich et al. 2001), a long evolutionary history of cooperative production in foraging societies is probably 
responsible for the universal human tendency to cooperate (Hill 2002). In spite of existing debates about 
the suitability of using these groups as examples of how early humans could have behaved (Estévez & Vila 
1996), its study allows us to open our minds in this sense as they exemplify this feature best (Apicella et 
al. 2012), and also to understand how such tendencies evolved (Hill 2002). 
 
We define cooperation as a social relationship that allows certain social and economic practices to take 
place in a particular way in which different social agents get involved: these agents develop production, 
distribution and consumption processes collectively so that profits/returns/payoff for all the individuals 
who participate get increased. The profits/returns/payoffs, which are not necessarily only material are 
neither immediate nor uniform (there is not necessarily a proportional relation between investment and 
benefits). Social benefits such as reputation, which can be materialized in future material benefits, may play 
an outstanding role more important than immediate material benefits 
Ethnographical documentation about this society as well as general anthropological background knowledge 
allows us to have a clear idea about how cooperative practices would have taken place in our case study. It 
also allows us to enrich the range of pay-offs, which are focused on the reproduction of different aspects of 
social life that could have been derived from an aggregation event. On one hand, increase of labour force 
and “technological knowledge capital” could have lead not only to educate the younger in particular 
manufacturing (transfer of knowledge) but in a more general way to innovate. On the other hand there are 
other pay-offs regarding social organization: rites of passage or other “cultural reproduction” activities such 
as singing, explaining myths and tales or playing. 
 
3. -MAKING HYPOTHESIS ABOUT SOCIAL COOPERATION. ETHNOARCHAEOLOGY AND COMPUTER 
SIMULATION: BRIDGING THE GAP 
Thorough the history of archaeological research, considerable efforts has been devoted to theoretical and 
epistemological reflections about the relationship between the archaeological record and the dynamics of 
past societies. The need of a methodological improvement to go beyond the fragmentary nature of material 
evidence and to reach a solid interpretation of the social and historical processes (Lull 1988; 2005) has been 
a long-standing aim in the archaeological inquiry. In this sense, New Archaeology explicitly tackled this 
issue engendering different interpretative tools such as the extensive use of models or the development of 
Middle Range Theory (Binford 1977). 
 
It is important to remark here that we consider ethnoarchaeology as a methodological tool for the 
development of new methods, techniques and hypothesis in archaeology (Agorsah 1990; Aldenfender 2001; 
Béyries 1997; Béyries & Pétrequin 2001; Carlson 2009; David & Kramer 2001; Estévez & Vila 1996; 
Gould 1980; Roux 2007). For us, ethnoarchaeology entails the critical use of ethnographical, ethnological 
and historical sources about recent past societies (Axtell 1979; Carlson 2009; Davidson 2006; De Rojas 
2008) and ethnographic living societies (Politis 2007). The general aim is to obtain analytical tools for 
answering social questions, improving our archaeological methods and/or hypothesis (Briz 2010; Zurro et 
al. 2010) through the dialectical contrast between archaeological method and results and ethnographical 
sources (Estévez & Vila 1996). 
 
Computer simulation offers the opportunity to include theoretical foundations on the basis of empirical 
observation of the archaeological and historical records. This allows on one hand to find evidence and 
assumptions about a given historical/social process and, on the other, to analyse its dynamics, its logical 
implications and, hence, the plausibility of a given hypothesis or interpretation. Likewise computer 
simulation constitutes a powerful tool to assess how a practice may evolve in a particular time frame. Thus, 
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it brings the possibility to experiment in archaeology and consequently to narrow the range of plausible 
paths to investigate past societies. 
 
Agent-based modelling is characterized by the way the abstraction of the target system is constructed. In 
an ABM there is a direct correspondence among the entities observed in the real system - and the 
interactions among them - and agents that represent individually and explicitly those entities in the 
computational model (Edmonds 2001). ABM makes easier the abstraction of the target system, giving the 
opportunity of implementing idiosyncratic characteristics of past social human dynamics, e.g. 
heterogeneity, autonomy, explicit space, local interactions or bounded rationality (Epstein 1999), but 
obliging at the same time to the logical consistency of formal models. 
 
Even though within ABM in archaeology there are some complicated models that attempt to reproduce or 
emulate real empirical archaeological data and high-level patterns, in the present case we use an 
experimental or exploratory approach to build simple and heuristic models focussed on controlled 
experimentation, theory building and hypothesis generation (Premo 2010) (see examples of this type of 
research in Kohler & van der Leeuw (2007) and Kohler et al. (2012)). This approach allows us to explore 
different conditions and variables involved in the emergence, development and resilience of a given social 
phenomenon or process. By systematically varying these variables and conditions of experimental 
parameters, we are able to study the range of plausible conditions that affect, as well as to what extent, the 
phenomenon under study (Premo 2010).  
 
Consequently, computer simulation is used here as a tool to build a model focused on the evolution of social 
cooperation in a hunter-fisher-gatherer society from Tierra del Fuego. The ethnographical sources and 
ethnoarchaeological results provide the basic social rules and variables followed by the agents of the 
simulation. 
 
4. -LATE HUNTER-FISHER-GATHERER SOCIETIES OF FUEGIAN CHANNELS. CASE STUDY: THE YAMANA 
SOCIETY. 
Yamana or Yaghan was a hunter-fisher-gatherer society that inhabited the uttermost tip of South America 
during XIXth and XXth Centuries (Gusinde 1937). Over 7000 years, the societies that established on this 
region developed a long-lasting social organization based on fishing, hunting and gathering strategies as 
well as on the development of nautical technology (Orquera et al. 2011). These marine-coastal economies 
persisted until European arrival at XVIIth Century and collapsed three centuries later, following the same 
colonization trend of the rest of America.  
 
	
Fig.		1.	Map	of	Tierra	del	Fuego 
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According to archaeological and ethnohistorical information, this society developed a hunter-gatherer and 
fishing economy specialized in the management and exploitation of maritime resources: pinnipeds, seabirds 
and guanacos hunting, shellfish gathering and fishing (Orquera & Piana 1999; 2009). In order to avoid 
resource depletion, a high level of mobility on canoes of small groups (even single canoe) was the most 
common behaviour. But, in any case, cooperation seems to have been an equally important element in daily 
practices, involving both relatives and non-relatives. 
 
Evidence for cooperative activities is clearly documented in historical written sources and most of them are 
related to food procurement: guanaco hunting (Bridges, MS: 08-14-1872, 06-15-1877), seabirds hunting 
(Bridges, MS: 03-28-1870; Hyades and Deniker, 1891: 359-360; Gusinde 1937: 509), fishing (Bridges MS: 
11-20-1871, 01-02-1872, 07-17-1877; Gusinde 1937: 531), mussels and mushrooms gathering (Bridges, 
MS: 10-26-1870, 06-14-1872, 06-15-1877; Gusinde 1937: 523) or to the acquisition of bark to make the 
canoes  (Gusinde 1937: 424; Hyades & Deniker 1891: 350).  
 
	
Fig.		2.	Landscape	of	the	Beagle	channel 
However, historical documents provide an interesting case in which communal participation, reciprocity, 
social reputation, and norms were enhanced and more explicitly ruled. This dynamic occurred when a 
cetacean or massive fish stranded on the coast (among others: Bridges, MS: 05-26-1872; 01-15-1872, 03-
19-1872; Lothrop, 1928; Gusinde, 1937: 355, 375 and 532-533). 
According to the sources, when a person discovered a whale drifted ashore, he/she lighted a fire in order to 
communicate the nearby families the finding by smoke signals (Gusinde 1937: 990; Martial 1888: 181). If 
the signal was perceived, an aggregation episode could take place, getting together a high number of people 
to share the feast; this scenario also provided the opportunity to celebrate youngsters´ initiation ceremonies 
and communal works (Gusinde 1937: 789-790). The steps after the animal discovery were precisely ruled: 
the person who discovered the animal was considered the “responsible”/holder of a fair and tidy 
distribution. Commonly, mature and reputed men agreed with him/her about who would process the whale 
since not everyone had the experience and skills to accomplish the task (Gusinde 1937: 578). This specialist, 
called “wálaputës” in Yamana language, selected the assistants to accomplish the activity (Gusinde 1937: 
558).  
It is important to remark here that whale stranding was an unpredictable event, and people did not develop 
the technology to hunt these sea mammals in the open sea. However, occasionally if a wounded whale 
swam near the coast, Yamana people got closed to the prey with their canoes to kill it using their harpoons 
and spears (Gusinde 1937: 460; Lothrop 1928: 33).  
 
The paramount value of a whale in Yamana social life can be traced in different lines of evidence. First, 
references about whale stranding are frequent and detailed in the historical accounts; there were specific 
terms to name the parts of a whale (Bridges 1933). Likewise all sources agree that the event was a festive 
social occasion and profusely describe the atmosphere of happiness and enthusiasm provoked by a whale 
stranded (Chapman 2010; Gusinde 1937: 375). Second, historical records indicate that whale blubber and 
mushrooms were the only edible resources people habitually stored using preservation techniques. While 
the first one was preserved dehydrated, whale blubber was preserved in peat-bogs (Gusinde 1937; Orquera 
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& Piana 1999: 197-198). Consequently, in peat bog areas the accumulation of portions of whale was a real 
option, despite of the social rule of common consumption with other members of the society. Third, 
relevance of whales for Yamana way of life is demonstrated in the fact that they are embedded in the 
mythology and narratives of this group who had songs to bring them to the coast (Gusinde 1937; Fig 3). 
Finally, social norms sanctioned the person who did not notify the community the presence of a stranded 
whale (Bridges, 1876: 57, cited in Orquera & Piana 1999). A quarrel took place if the individuals were 
discovered and they were left aside in next episodes of food sharing. Thus, cooperation as a social positive 
value was strengthened even though there was food surplus. 
 
 
Fig.		3.	Yámana	canoe	in	the	Tekenika	mission	(courtesy	of	South	American	Missionary	Society) 
 
 
This study aims to quantify the incidence and interaction of each variable involved on this specific dynamic 
of social cooperation in order to clarify the relevance of reputation and imitation strategies for achieving a 
particular social behaviour. 
 
5. -DESCRIPTION OF THE WWHW MODEL 
PURPOSE AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
WWHW (Wave When Hale Whale) is an agent-based model developed with the aim of exploring the 
emergence, resilience and evolution of cooperation in in hunter-fisher-gatherer societies, such as Yamana 
society, in which individuals face the social dilemma of calling and sharing a highly profitable but 
unpredictable resource. The model abstracts the main factors that, in our opinion, might condition the 
evolution of cooperation: 
 A social mechanism of indirect reciprocity that promotes cooperation;  
 The stochasticity of the natural events that generate opportunities of cooperation;  
 The characteristics of these events that determine their visibility – i.e. the ease for people to find 
them – and the chances of being detected if someone does not cooperate (defect);  
 The relative benefit of the social activities that people develop when they gather together in 
aggregations. 
Another important assumption of the model is the evolutionary mechanism in the imitation process of 
strategies. The appendix A includes a complete description of the model following the documentation 
protocol ODD (Grimm et al. 2010). The supporting material provides an applet of the model, implemented 
in NetLogo 5.0 (Wilensky 1999) and the source code.  
ENTITIES, STATE VARIABLES AND SCALES 
The spatial environment is represented as a 2-dimensional plane regularly divided into MxM equal-size 
spatial units, called Patches, that represent water, beach and land spatial cells (Fig. 4).	 The relevant 
parameter of the spatial distribution of patches is the beach-density that determines the number of beach 
patches where whales can strand. 
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Fig.		4.	Two‐dimensional	representation	of	an	environment,	consisting	of	201×201	patches	(blue	for	water	patches,	
yellow	for	beach	patches	and	brown	for	land	patches)	
There are two types of agents: People and Whales. People agents represent households/canoes; they move 
looking for beached Whales and make decisions about whether to call or not other People when a beached 
Whale is found. The number of people remains constant in the course of a simulation run. On the other 
hand, Whales are non-mobile agents and represent a scarce but important source of meat that appears from 
time at one of the beach patches, providing perishable food. 
The WWHW model is characterized by a set of variables of different nature: the study parameters (Table 
1) are the exogenous variables established by the user that define a computational experiment under analysis, 
a given scenario, and that remain constant in each run; the entities' variables define the state of each 
individual entity (agent), namely People (Table 2) and Whales (Table 3), at each period of time; and a set 
of global variables that determine some accessory features of the entities and the model. 
 
TABLE	1.	STUDY	PARAMETERS	
Parameter name Brief description 
prob-beached-whale Probability that a Whale beaches at each time period. Whales appear at one of the 
beach patches (the beached whale process is fully described in the Process 
Section). 
social-capital-vs-meat-
sensitivity 
Parameter in the range [0,1] that modulates the relative importance of the social-
capital vs. meat in the fitness function –the higher value, the more relative weight 
of social-capital–. 
vision Maximum distance (measured in number of patches) within which People can see 
beached Whales. 
signal-range Maximum distance (measured in number of patches) of the signal (e.g. smoke) 
created by cooperative People at the location of a beached Whale to help others to 
find the resource. 
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distance-walked-per-
tick 
Number of patches that a People agent can move at each time period. 
prob-mutation Probability of an error or an exploratory strategy in the imitation process of 
People's strategies. 
rounds-per-generation People can imitate other strategies (selection process) every rounds-per-
generation periods of time. 
beach-density Fraction of beach patches. The rest of Patches, corresponding to the (1-beach-
density) of the total of patches, are equally divided into land and water Patches. 
people-density Density of People in the 2-D space (measured as the total number of People 
divided by the total number of patches). 
	
TABLE	2.	PEOPLE’S	STATE	VARIABLES	
Variable name Brief description
prob-cooperation Probability of a People agent cooperates. We suppose there are only two 
strategies of cooperation: always cooperate (prob-cooperation=1) and always 
defect (prob-cooperation=0). 
last-public-prob-
cooperation 
The last public prob-cooperation. Whenever a People agent makes a public call 
and someone comes, or defects and someone observes her defection, this variable 
is updated with the current prob-cooperation. 
meat Stock of Whale meat held by a People agent. 
social-capital Stock of social capital acquired by a People agent. 
fitness Value of a People agent's success, determined by the variables meat and social-
capital, used in the imitation process. 
reputation Variable in the range [0,1] that represents the reputation of a People agent. 
{n-calls-history,  n-
been-caught-history } 
Vectors that contain respectively the times a People agent called others and an 
aggregation happened, and the times she defected and was caught by someone, 
in the last history-size of generations 
	
TABLE	3.	WHALES’ STATE VARIABLES	
Variable name Brief description
my-range Radius (measured in number of patches) within which the Whale is visible by 
People. This range is equal to the vision of the People if the Whale has not been 
made public (i.e. if no agent has made a signal for this Whale), or the signal-
range, if a People agent has already made the Whale public (by creating a signal).
caller If the Whale is public, this variable stores the People agent who made it public 
by creating the signal; otherwise the variable has a “nobody” value. 
public? Boolean variable which is “true” when the Whale is public (i.e. a People agent 
created a signal indicating the location of the Whale), and “false” otherwise. 
Life The number of time periods that a Whale will stay in the environment before 
disappearing. It is decreased in one unit after each period. 
	
 
 
9	
	
PROCESS OVERVIEW AND SCHEDULING 
The scheduling of the set of events that take place in discrete time-steps (or “ticks”) is represented in Figure	
5. 
 
 
Fig.		5.	Flow	diagram	of	the	schedule	of	execution.	The	order	in	which	agents	are	chosen	in	“for	each”statements	is	
always	random	to	avoid	bias	in	agent	selection	
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With probability prob-beached-whale a Whale appears at a randomly chosen beach patch (beach-a-whale 
procedure). A beached Whale is detected (be-seen procedure) by any People agent without target and at a 
distance of my-range, or closer, from the Whale. When a People agent detects a Whale, moves (walk 
procedure) towards it until she arrives at its same Patch; if not, the agent moves randomly. In all cases, the 
distance travelled corresponds to the parameter distance-walked-per-tick. 
When a People agent reaches a Whale and nobody has publicly announced its presence yet –the state of the 
Whale is private- she makes a decision, in particular she creates a signal with probability prob-cooperation 
changing the state of the Whale to public (call-others procedure). The limit distance my-range depends on 
the state of the Whale, i.e. is it or not public? If the Whale is not public the variable my-range is equal to 
the parameter vision, which represents the natural distance at which a People agent can see the food source. 
However, if the Whale is public, i.e. a People agent has already called everybody else creating a public 
signal, my-range gets the value of the parameter signal-range. 
The reputation of a People agent depends on her public history of past actions, stored in two vectors: n-
calls-history and n-been-caught-history. If a People agent decided to call everyone else and there was a 
witness of her action, she adds a unit in the current generation period of the vector n-calls-history (be-
rewarded procedure). On the other hand, if the agent decided not to call and there were witnesses of that 
defection, she adds a unit in the current generation period of the other vector n-been-caught-history. 
Then, each People agent updates her reputation (procedure update-reputation). The reputation Ri of the 
People agent i is computed as the division between two moving averages according to the next equation:  
ܴ௜ ൌ
∑ ൫#ܥ݋݋݌݁ݎܽݐ݁௝൯ߜ௝௛௝ୀଵ
∑ ൫#ܥ݋݋݌݁ݎܽݐ݁௝ ∪ #ܤ݁ܵ݁݁݊ܦ݂݁݁ܿݐ݅݊݃௝൯ߜ௝௛௝ୀଵ
∈ ሾ0,1ሿ EQ. 1 
The term ߜ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ corresponds to the discount factor parameter history-past-discount. This parameter 
takes into account how important is the shadow of the past in terms of reputation. Values close to one mean 
that events in the past and the present are equally important for the population, however values close to 
zero give much more weight to recent events than decisions taken in the past. The term #ܥ݋݋݌݁ݎܽݐ݁௝ 
corresponds to the j element of the vector n-calls-history, and the term #ܤ݁ܵ݁݁݊ܦ݂݁݁ܿݐ݅݊݃௝  to the j 
element of the vector n-been-caught-history. Both vectors always collect the last history-size (h index) 
registers of the agent's generations.  
Note that the reputation of a People agent only can change when she makes an action (cooperate or defect) 
that is observed by someone else. If she defects but she is not caught, the reputation does not change, and 
similarly, if she cooperates but nobody comes to the call, the reputation does not change either. This feature 
matches the hypothesis that reputation is a kind of social tag that someone always receives from the others, 
and cannot be changed by her owner. 
Afterwards (rot-and-be-eaten procedure), People exploit the Whale, storing meat, and participate in social 
activities, storing social-capital. We simplify the process of storing meat and social-capital assuming that: 
(1) the number of ticks a Whale stays in the model is fixed, and (2) the gain per tick of these stock variables 
–marginal gain– for any People agent depends only on the number of People sharing the Whale at each 
moment and her reputation. Following these assumptions, the marginal meat per tick ߂ܯ௜ሺݐሻ that a People agent i gets in an aggregation of size N, -she consequently has to share the meat with N-1 individuals- is 
formalized by a bell-shaped function: 
߂ܯ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ݁ିఈ൫ሺேሺ௧ሻିଵሻିఓ൯
మ ݓ݅ݐ݄ ߂ܯ௜ሺݐሻ ⩾ 0 EQ. 2 
The terms	ߙ and ߤ module the width and the peak location of the function. Depending on the value of ߤ, 
the function shows increasing and decreasing returns in different ranges of N. Although it is possible that 
the real exploitation of a whale by households initially showed increasing returns with the size of the 
aggregation we set ߤ ൌ 0 focusing our analysis on the range of decreasing returns that depicts a more 
critical scenario for the evolution of cooperation. 
On the other hand, the marginal social-capital per tick ߂ܵܥ௜ሺݐሻ  that a People agent i obtains in an aggregation of size N is computed by the following function: 
߂ܵܥ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ܴ௜൫1 െ ݁ିఈሺேሺ௧ሻିଵሻమ൯ ݓ݅ݐ݄ ߂ܵܥ௜ሺݐሻ ⩾ 0 EQ. 3 
In this case, the function is monotonically increasing with the size of the aggregation N, and has a superior 
asymptote at the reputation of the agent Ri. We suppose that a People agent's reputation conditions her 
capacity to gain social capital form others – i.e. if someone has bad reputation it is more probably that 
nobody wants to join her in social activities–. All these assumptions match the hypothesis that social capital 
always grows with the number of people participating in social activities, although as this number increases, 
the marginal contributions of new participants decrease because they are probably redundant, limiting the 
gain of social-capital. 
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The fitness function quantifies the success of a People agent and takes into account the last two stock 
variables: 
ܨ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ߠܵܥ௜ሺݐሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻܯ௜ሺݐሻ ݓ݅ݐ݄ ߠ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁
ܵܥ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ܵܥ௜ሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൅ ߂ܵܥ௜ሺݐሻ
ܯ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ܯ௜ሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൅ ߂ܯ௜ሺݐሻ
 
EQ. 4 
The term ߠ modulates the relative importance of each factor and corresponds to the model parameter social-
capital-vs-meat-sensitivity; the higher value of ߠ, the more importance of social-capital. 
Finally, when a period of rounds-per-generation ticks is reached, a process of imitation occurs (select-
cooperation-strategy procedure). The selection process is implemented as a random tournament: each agent 
chooses randomly another in the population with probability directly proportionate to its fitness, if the 
picker has got less fitness she copies the strategy of the choice, or explores a new strategy randomly chosen 
between the strategy space with probability prob-mutation. It is important to note that the value copied into 
the variable prob-cooperation is the variable last-public-prob-cooperation. The hypothesis is that a People 
agent only can imitate observable values, i.e. the strategy of a People is observable whenever there was a 
witness of her behaviour, cooperation or defection. After the imitation process, People agents initialize their 
variables meat, social-capital and fitness to zero, but do not change their reputation and their vectors of 
past history. 
 
6. -ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
The WWHW model has been designed as a “tool-to-think-with”. It is not meant to provide precise 
quantitative predictions, but to assist researchers in understanding the mechanisms and conditions in which 
people might cooperate and call each other when they find a beached whale. The inferences we want to get 
are from the kind of “the vision does or does not favour cooperation in the society” or “the frequency of 
beached whales does or does not favour cooperation in the society”. In order to get this, the analysis is 
focused on the asymptotic behaviour –the long run– of the system. In this model, when People can explore 
(random mutation) besides imitating strategies, the system becomes ergodic and consequently the 
asymptotic behaviour is independent of the initial conditions (Izquierdo et al. 2009). We let each simulation 
run a sufficiently long time to guarantee that the effects of the initial conditions have disappeared, and 
replicate several random and independent samples for each parameterization to get statistics accurate 
enough1. The state of the system is represented with the average cooperation of the population (denoted by 
the term cooperation C from now on), and it is computed and recorded for each tick. 
STATIONARY REGIMES 
The Figure 6 shows the histograms of the stationary regimes for different combinations of the parameters 
social-capital-vs-meat-sensitivity ሺߠሻ and vision ሺ߭ሻ, when the prob-beached-whale ሺ ௕ܲ௪ሻ is 0.05 (similar results are obtained for other probabilities). A first inference from these results allows us to make a simple 
characterization of the stationary behaviour. The system mostly reaches one of the two stationary regimes 
that we have defined as “All Cooperation” (AC), whenever ܥ ⩾ 0.9, and “All Defection” (AD), whenever 
ܥ ⩽ 0.1. The rest of regimes are almost negligible, and they are gathered in the “Majority Cooperation” 
(MC) regime, whenever 0.5 ⩽ ܥ ൏ 0.9, and “Majority Defection” (DF) regime, whenever 0.1 ൏ ܥ ൏ 0.5. 
 
																																																								
1 The initial state for all simulations corresponds to a population of fifty-fifty cooperators and defectors randomly 
distributed. in the space. The core parameters {vision, social-capital-vs-meat-sensitivity, prob-beached-whale} are 
explored fixing the rest of the parameterization: {people-density=0.002 (82 agents); beach-density=0.5;  prob-
random-move=1; distance-walked-per-tick=4; signal-range=50; rounds-per-generation=50; prob-
mutation=0.025; history-size=10; history-past-discount=0.8; tournament-size=5;}. Time limit for a simulation is 
105 ticks, and 50 replications have been run for each experiment. 
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Fig.		6.	Array	of	histograms	of	the	stationary	cooperation	for	a	combination	of	the	parameters	social‐capital‐vs‐
meat‐sensitivity	(θ)	and	vision	(υ),	when	the	probability	P_bw	is	0.05.	Results	show	that	the	stationary	behaviour	of	
the	model	concentrates	in	the	region	of	All	Cooperation	(percentage	of	cooperators	close	to	one)	or	the	region	of	All	
Defection	(percentage	of	cooperators	close	to	zero).	simulations	in	between	these	extreme	cases	are	unlikely.	
 
Interpretation of these computational results is rather intuitive. When ߠ ൌ 0, that is, there is no indirect 
reciprocity in the society and agents' fitness is driven only by the consumption of meat, the AD regime is 
reached in almost all cases –with the exception of low values of vision ሺ߭ሻ that we will explain afterwards–. 
However, when the value of social-capital grows –in terms of fitness– and consequently the social 
reputation mechanism has effects on the imitation process, the AC regime becomes the most important, 
even for very low values of ߠ. 
 
For the sake of clarity, the results are showed in a different way in the Figure 7. Here, the frequencies of 
the stationary regimes in two different cases, with and without indirect reciprocity, are showed for several 
probabilities of beached whale. 
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Fig.		7.	Above,	the	bar	plots	of	the	frequencies	of	the	stationary	regimes	for	the	case	without	indirect	reciprocity	
θ=0,	when	the	parameter	vision	varies	and	the	P_bw	is	fixed.	Below,	the	same	plots	for	the	case	with	indirect	
reciprocity	(θ=0.1).	
THE EFFECT OF VISION  
In order to understand the effect of vision, we show in the Figure 8	 the average cooperation when the 
probability of strand remains constant and vision and ߠ vary. In the range of ߠ in which both AC and AD 
regimes are possible, we see that vision pushes the levels of cooperation up for all frequencies of beached-
whale (i.e. the higher values of vision the higher values of cooperation). The explanation is quite intuitive 
too, as far as vision grows the visibility of scarce resources and the chances of detecting defectors grow as 
well. When there is no indirect reciprocity	ሺߠ ൌ 0ሻ, the first feature reduces the difference in terms of 
fitness of cooperators and defectors because the probability of finding meat grows for everybody despite 
of their strategy. When the indirect reciprocity mechanism works	ሺߠ ൐ 0ሻ, the second feature clearly 
reduces the advantage of any selfish behaviour, because defectors tend to have low reputation. 
There is a particular and interesting result when vision is significantly low ሺ߭ ൌ 5ሻ. In this case, the system 
always reaches cooperation, even for ߠ ൌ 0 when defection should be the expected regime. To explain this 
contra-intuitive result we have to go to one of the assumption of the model: the imitation of public strategies. 
The hypothesis of the model is that a People agent only can imitate observable values. Under this 
assumption, only when an individual makes a public call and someone comes, or defects and someone 
observes her defection, her strategy becomes public. When vision is low, a defection is rarely detected, so 
when someone imitates a defector, she is really imitating the last public behaviour of the defector, which 
probably corresponds to a past cooperative strategy since cooperation implies making public the strategy. 
Therefore, the imitation mechanism reinforces positively the cooperative behaviour, and this effect 
dominates the system behaviour for low values of vision. 
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Fig.		8.	Each	graph	shows	the	average	cooperation	at	the	end	of	simulations	for	different	values	of	θ	when	the	
parameter	vision	varies,	and	the	probability	P_bw	is	fixed	to	a	particular	value.	
7. -CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is already well known that there is an universal human tendency to cooperate. The purpose of this 
research, therefore, is going far beyond. We aim to understand the conditions and mechanisms through 
which cooperation is given in order to analyze how social ties (that are part of human nature) work.  
 
Even though Yamana society is just one more example, this case study provides the opportunity to analyze 
cooperation in terms of a very specific and time-constrained dilemma. In this particular case, we already 
know on the basis of ethnographical sources, that people promote cooperative attitudes and penalize those 
who do not cooperate. Social norms act as a way to regulate individual behaviour (in this case of the agents, 
which are understood as a social unit or household/canoe) in relation to what we can consider a social 
standard that is promoted. 
 
This paper shows the state-of-the-art of the case study and first results obtained through the experimentation 
process. The model shows that just polarized behaviours are stable. The system reaches a regime where a 
cooperative norm is established or a regime where selfish defection is generalized; intermediate results are 
very unlikely. Our analysis shows that two key parameters influence the chances that population 
coordinates in one or other state. If the resource is the element that completely determines the survival 
fitness of the population, general defection is the most probable outcome. However, if social life modulated 
by reputation becomes relevant in the society, even for low values, then benefits from aggregation are 
salient. Thus a strategy that capitalizes social reputation proves to be more successful, and consequently 
the cooperative norm is promoted. The other relevant cause is the effect of vision, how easy is to find the 
resource and hence to detect a possible defector. In general when social capital matters, vision enhances 
cooperative behaviour. These computational results support in a formal way the hypothesis about the 
influence of variables that appear to be of paramount relevance such as the role of reputation and imitation 
of strategies in promoting or hindering cooperation, the fact that individual behaviour becomes social when 
decisions (cooperate or defect) are made public, or the opportunities of cheating and social punishment, 
among others. 
 
Likewise, these results show that a stranded whale not only afforded food, raw materials but also provided 
the conditions to enhance social capital in Yamana society and to reinforce a network of relationships that 
is crucial for social reproduction (such as providing a scenario to develop youngster initiation ceremonies). 
In other words, the exceptional accumulation of food mainly offered the possibility to perform practices 
and to materialize norms that create and recreate the habitus (Bourdieu 1977) of the social life. 
Consequently, the value of the whale cannot be reduced either to its nutritional content or to the possibility 
to gather people otherwise disperse, as it produces a context for displaying social prestige and for a public 
demonstration of generosity (that could be utterly used to obtain mates, to reinforce social networks to cope 
with stress conditions etc.). This situation could explain the apparent low incidence of storage of whale 
blubber at individual/household level.  
 
It is interesting to remark here that evidence attained by this case study provides experimental and empirical 
support to signaling theory (Bliege Bird and Smith 2005) to the extent it highlights the paramount 
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importance of symbolic capital for obtaining benefits with material consequences. At the same time and in 
relation to hunter-gatherer research, these results show the value of reputation in a society with relative low 
levels of social heterogeneity or inequality among households.  
 
The combination of ABM models and ethnographical sources within the framework of an 
ethnoarchaeological approach offers a heuristic and valuable tool to unveil the mechanisms embedded in 
cooperation practices; it has proved to be useful to formulate new hypothesis and to notice the strength of 
social ties and the effort invested in their maintenance. Cooperation, as a particular type of social behaviour, 
may generate contexts where other social dimensions are enhanced: in our case study, ceremonies and many 
other activities were carried out during aggregation events in which cooperation was an essential factor. 
 
This research constitutes part of a broaden project addressed to explore cooperation in hunter-gatherer 
societies and to develop archaeological methods and theory in hunter-gatherer inquiry such as identifying 
the materiality of cooperation in the frame of aggregation events (Briz et al. 2009; Zurro et al. 2010). To 
accomplish this general goal the dynamic of cooperative behaviors has to be disentangled. Thus, the future 
agenda entails the construction of a solid corpus of hypothesis, on the basis of historical reports and 
simulation results, in order to elucidate what kind of archaeological variability is considered relevant in 
social aggregation/cooperation episodes. From our concern an accurate identification of the variables 
implied in these social phenomena will lead to recognize unambiguous anthropic markers of social 
cooperation to be extended to different case studies. 
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